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To their own great loss, Americans are scantily acquainted with
the friendly people and delightful scenery of Finland. Despite Finland's
geographical and cultural remoteness, however, students of government
in the United States have become increasingly curious about that small
country's long experience with nonjudicial watchmen against governmental aberrations.' Knowledge of Finland's experience may assist
others' searches for simplified safeguards against official mistakes and
misdeeds.2
* Coypright 1966 by Walter Gellhorn. The substance of this article will appear
in a volume to be published by Harvard University Press in 1966.
t Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1927, L.H.D. 1952, Amherst College; LL.B. 1931, Columbia University; LL.D. 1963, University of Pennsylvania.
1 "Small country" is, of course, only a relative term. Finland's area is larger
than that of New York, New Jersey, all the New England states, and Maryland in
combination, or than that of Eire, Scotland, Wales, and England together. Almost
a tenth of its surface is covered by lakes, however, and part of its territory is in the
as yet unproductive Far North. The population totals only about four and a half
million, of whom roughly half a million live in the largest city, Helsinki. The next
two 2largest cities in the nation have populations of a bit less than 150,000.
Finnish experience has not been much discussed in English language publications.
The main papers are Kastari, The Parliamentary Ombudsman; His Functions, Position, and Relation to the Chancellor of Justice in Finland, 28 INT'L REV. OF ADnIMsvTRAivE SciNcE 391 (1962) ; Kastari, The Chancellor of Justice and the Ombudsman,
in THE OMMUDSMAN: Cmrnz's DEFENDER 83-113 (Rowat ed., 1965) ; Rowat Finlands'

Defenders of the Law: The Chancellor of Justice and the ParliamentaryOmbudsman,
4 CANADIAN PuBLIc ADmINISTRATION 361, 412 (1961). See also CHAPmAN, THE
PRoFEssIoN oF GovRNwMENT 245-59 (1959); Anderson, The Scandinavian Ombtdsman, 12 AMERICAN-SCANDINAViAN REV. 403 (1964).

In 1965 the Ombudsman's office

itself published an informative booklet entitled The Position and Functions of the
Finnish ParliamentaryOmbudsman. For general background material, see MEIUosKI,
2-'ascis Du DaorT PuB3LIc DE .. A FIN-ANDE (1954).
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I. A PAGE OR Two OF HISTORY
Finland, for six centuries a part of the realm of Sweden, was
ceded to the Russian Empire in 1809. Accorded the special status
of grand duchy within the empire, it continued to have its own laws,
its own autonomous administration, and its own state church. The
Czar, an autocratic ruler in Russia itself, was simply the Grand Duke
of Finland and thus subject to constitutional restrictions as had been
the King of Sweden previously.
Somewhat ironically, the people of Sweden wrought major
changes in their constitution almost at the moment when Finland
ceased being directly governed by it. The discarded and outmoded
terms of the Swedish Constitutional Acts of 1772 and 1789 were
nevertheless carried over into the new Grand Duchy of Finland. They
provided the framework of government until more than a century later
when Finland's national independence was granted by the Russian
Bolsheviks.
One of the Swedish institutions that continued in the Grand Duchy
was the office of Chancellor of Justice. In origin the Chancellor was
a royal appointee, charged with the responsibility of overseeing the
King's servants. In time he became the chief prosecutor, commanded
by his royal master to ferret out faithless officials. While in Sweden
the importance of this post declined after 1809,3 it flourished in Finland
with no change in powers or responsibilities despite acquiring the title
of Procurator by which a similar office was known in Russia.
Unable to resist engulfment by physical force, Finns sought to
keep their Russian overlords in place by insistently strict observance of
legality in all governmental relationships. The basic laws to which
such devoted attention was paid had not been particularly enlightened
or well designed in the first place, nor had they been improved by
age. But they did have the great virtue of being known quantities,
not subject to change without notice by czarist fiat. Watchfulness
against disregard of the old laws fostered what Jan-Magnus Jansson,
a leading Finnish political scientist, recently characterized as a kind of
antiquarian spirit among Finland's lawyers. Although this antiquarianism may not have opened the doors to the future, it did help to keep
them closed against the loss of political autonomy.
During the decades immediately preceding World War I the
Russian government exerted great pressures to end Finland's privileged
position within the empire. A few Chancellors of Justice and local
3 See Gellhorn, The Swedish Ombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1 (1965) ; cf. Rridhdm,
THE O.BuDsm.AN: CITIz-'s DEFNDER 17 (Rowat
ed. 1965).
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judges withstood those pressures. They heroically obstructed the
enforcement of "imperial legislation" they considered incompatible
with the Grand Duchy's basic laws. The jurists' intractability proved
to be perhaps the main impediment to easy realization of czarist plans.
Pertinacious scrutinizing of legal questions became, indeed, almost a
patriotic obligation in the troubled days when encroachment upon the
laws might have been the prelude to ethnic subjugation. Legal technicalities often frustrated, though they could never entirely block, the
mighty and increasingly hostile government of the Czar.
That period left its stamp on now independent Finland. Legal
precision, perhaps at first merely a tactic, has become a firm national
policy, an ingrained habit, almost an obsession for whose perpetuation
Finland's official watchmen are responsible.
Finland's independence did not alter the position of the Chancellor
of Justice. The new government simply restored the ancient title and
changed the personnel.4 When a constitution was later adopted in
1919, it not only preserved the Chancellor's office substantially as it
had been, but also created the parallel office of Parliamentary
Ombudsman, to perform much the same work and with many of the
same powers. History and tradition had linked the Chancellor with the
Government, that is, with the executive branch. Henceforth a separate
guardian against executive misdeeds was to be at the legislature's
disposal.
II. CHOOSING THE WATCHMEN

Manner of appointment. The President alone appoints the Chancellor, "who must possess a mastery of the Law." 6 He serves until
retirement unless the President removes him sooner for the good of
the nation, an eventuality that has not yet arisen. The Chancellor himself can be prosecuted if he exercises his functions "in a manner
contrary to law." 6
Parliament alone chooses the Ombudsman, who is required only
to be "a person distinguished in law." 7 He is elected by simple
majority vote to serve for four years. During that term he is irremovable; moreover, no provision has been made for prosecuting
him were he to misuse his office. When his four year term ends,
Parliament may shunt him aside, as has occurred twice since World
War II.
4 The first post-Russian appointee travelled to his job all the way from Siberia,
where he had been exiled some years previously for resisting the authority of a
Russian
incumbent.
5
FINLAND CoNST. art. 37.
0
FINLAND CoNsT. art. 47.
7
FInLAND CONST. art. 49.
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The watchmen's powers. The Chancellor "must see that authorities and officials comply with the law and perform their duties so
that no person shall suffer injury to his rights." 8 The Ombudsman,
conformably with Parliament's instructions, "shall supervise the observance of the laws in the proceedings of courts and other authorities." I The Chancellor "shall have the right to assist at the sessions
of the Council of State [that is to say, the Cabinet] and those of all
tribunals and public departments, and he shall have access to the
minutes of the Council of State and its Ministries, of the tribunals and
other public authorities." 10 The Ombudsman "shall have the same
right as the Chancellor of Justice to assist at the sessions of the Council
of State and of tribunals and other public departments, to have access
to the minutes of the Council of State, and its Ministries, of the tribunals and other authorities." " The Chancellor and the Ombudsman
receive the same high salary, equal to that of the presidents of the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. If the President were to decide that a member of the Cabinet should be tried before
the Court of Impeachment, the Chancellor would serve as prosecutor;
if the Parliament were to make the same decision, the Ombudsman
would carry out the prosecution. If the President or a member of the
Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court were to be
impeached, either the Chancellor or the Ombudsman could prosecute.
This careful matching of Tweedledum with Tweedledee does
finally come to an end, however. The Chancellor is declared to be
the "Supreme Public Prosecutor" with responsibility for supervising
all prosecutors through the Republic.'"
On the other hand, the
Ombudsman is instructed to prosecute an impeached Chancellor, 8 while
the Chancellor has no similarly explicit authority to proceed against
the Ombudsman.
The watchmen's prestige. Despite the close resemblances just
noted, the Chancellor's prestige has undoubtedly exceeded the Ombudsman's. His office is the older and more glamorous, for the
Ombudsman never enjoyed the status of popular hero as the Chancellor
occasionally did in Russian times. Once appointed, the Chancellor
serves continuously despite changes in the country's political complexion. Superficially, therefore, he seems less tinctured by partisanship than is the Ombudsman, whom a vociferously partisan assemblage
46.
FINLAND CONST. art. 49.

8 FINLAND CONST. art.

9

'0 FINLAND CoNsT. art. 46.
".
FINLAND CoNsr. art. 49.
12
FINLAND CoNsT. art. 46.
8
1 PPARLimENT.RY DnmcrwEs

§ 4.
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elects quadrennially. 4 As a newcomer during the early days of the
Finnish republic, the Ombudsman modestly remained inconspicuous
and, consequently, was largely overlooked by a public already accustomed to turn to the Chancellor for protection. Though entitled to
attend Cabinet meetings, the Ombudsman refrained from doing so,
while the Chancellor rather ostentatiously kept close watch over the
highest governmental circles. Generally the Chancellor has come from
the Supreme Administrative Court or the Supreme Court and sometimes
has returned to his former tribunal to be its president. The Ombudsman, by contrast, has typically been drawn from a slightly lower level
of professional attainment, since the short term of his office makes it
unattractive to professors, judges of the highest rank, and similarly
secure persons. On several occasions the then incumbent Ombudsman
has welcomed appointment to the Supreme Administrative Court. This
has been regarded as a promotion because, though the Court's members
have a smaller income, their tenure is assured. One unusually successful Ombudsman resigned in order to accept a professorship of law, but
most have had to be content with lesser distinctions when leaving
that post.
The ranking of the two offices may possibly change. The Chancellor seems less venerated today than in the past. His close ties with
the Government may taint his independence, or at least be thought to
do so. Moreover, his role as the Government's legal counsel may
close his mind to questions that may later arise concerning the validity
of governmental actions. A former Chancellor, remarking that no
ministry had ever rejected his advice, added candidly that his advice
might not have been relied on so completely if his opinions had
vacillated. Realization of that fact, he acknowledged, had handicapped
him somewhat when a citizen later asked him to deal with what the
citizen regarded as an illegal act. "If the act had been done in accord
with advice I had given, I was not eager to find anything wrong with
it afterward," he admitted. The Ombudsman is not similarly inhibited,
simply because governmental proposals are not discussed with him at
an early stage as they are with the Chancellor.
Whatever may be the popularity rating of their respective offices
now or in the future, the incumbent Chancellor and Ombudsman are
14Usually two names are put forward to be voted upon in Parliament. No
all-party consensus is sought before the balloting begins. The vote is taken in closed
session, but, according to informed observers, the requisite majority is quickly obtained
because voting proceeds on party lines, though party activists have been shunned as
nominees.
In the beginning, the election of the Ombudsman was an annual affair. The
term of office was lengthened first to three years and, more recently, to four in an

effort to enhance the efficiency of the office and deemphasize the Ombudsman's dependence on the electors' favor.
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considerably respected and concededly nonpolitical. The Chancellor
had earned the high regard of lawyers during his fifteen years as a
member of the Supreme Court. The Ombudsman, after substantial
judicial experience, had headed the law preparation division of the
Ministry of Justice and, on a part time basis, had been secretary of the
Constitutional Committee of Parliament. Members of Parliament,
favorably impressed by his work, sought him out to be Ombudsman
when a vacancy occurred. He is well liked within the legal profession,
one of whose chief spokesmen described him as "an able general
specialist."
III. RELATIONSHIP TO THE EXECUTIVE
Executive organization. Defining Finland's governmental system
in a few words is not easy. Most functions of administration are
lodged in ministries headed by Cabinet Ministers, individually and collectively answerable to Parliament. At the same time administrative
tasks are performed by a number of central offices and boards that are
outside the official hierarchy of the ministries, though ultimately answerable to the Cabinet or to a Minister and, through that channel, to
Parliament. Finally, the nation's President is elected for a fixed term
and his continuance in office is therefore not dependent upon parliamentary support. His position has gained in stature over the years,
at least partly because cabinets have been short lived, no party having
won an absolute majority of the seats since 1917.15 He has power
under the Constitution to issue decrees not inconsistent with acts of
Parliament, and he is directed to "supervise the administration of the
State." 1 In exercising his powers the President must act in consultation with the Cabinet, but is not legally bound by its views.
Preauditingquestions of legality. All proposals to be acted upon
by the Cabinet, whether upon the initiative of the President or of a
Minister, are submitted to the Chancellor and to the Ombudsman for
their prior scrutiny. The Ombudsman would like to take seriously
his duty and opportunity to consider the legality of proposed decrees,
regulations, and legislative suggestions; but, to be blunt, in this respect
he is not taken seriously by others. He receives the agenda only fortyeight hours in advance of the meeting at which decisions are to be
made, thus having scant opportunity for thorough study of the tens and
sometimes hundreds of items on the agenda.
The Chancellor, on the other hand, really does play an important
part at this stage. Although he receives the official agenda just as
15
In the first forty-five years after independence was gained in 1917, Finland
had forty-seven cabinets. Jansson, A Century of Finni h Government, in INTRODUCTION To FINLAND 42, 54 (1963).

18 FiNLAND CoNST. art 32.
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tardily as the Ombudsman does, ministerial officials who are responsible for preparing papers for Cabinet consideration--or, often,
only for their own Minister's decision-consult him well in advance
concerning troublesome questions. His opinions and suggestions have
tremendous weight. Proposals about whose legality he has expressed
doubt are simply withdrawn for further study. He has no voice in
shaping policy, but of course, questions of law cannot always be neatly
separated from questions of policy. When the Chancellor does unequivocally declare that the law stands in the path of a proposal, even
the President must pay heed to his counsel .17 While the Ombudsman
has not attended a meeting of the Council of State since 1923, the
Chancellor or his Deputy is present at every session, not as a member
of the Cabinet with the right to vote, but as a legal censor who sits
slightly apart and who expresses his disapproval of the conclusions
reached by the Cabinet or the President if he regards them as indisputably unconstitutional.
Legal flexibility has been achieved by the ingenious Finnish device
of constitutional "exceptions." A legislative proposal the Chancellor
regards as inconsistent with the Constitution need not be abandoned.
Instead, it can be submitted to the Parliament for adoption by a special
vote, in the same manner as an amendment to the Constitution. So
far as is known, the Cabinet has never ignored the Chancellor's advice
to proceed by way of an "exception," which has the effect (if Parliament acquiesces) of bypassing the Constitution on an ad hoc basis
without permanently altering it. 8 Approximately six hundred laws
have been enacted by the special "constitutional procedure" since
1919; some of these have involved such basically important matters
1
7 FINLAND CONST. art. 45 provides: "If it should happen that a decision taken
by the President and to be executed by the Council of State is found to be contrary
to law, the Council, after hearing the opinion of the Chancellor of Justice, shall request
the President to withdraw or modify his decision, and, if the President nevertheless
adheres to his decision, the Council must declare that the decision cannot be enforced."
FINLAND CONST. art. 47 states in part:
If in the exercise of their functions the Council of State or any of its
members act in a manner contrary to law, it is incumbent upon the Chancellor
of Justice to make representation upon the subject and at the same time
indicate in what respect the act is illegal. If no heed is taken of such representation, the Chancellor of Justice shall have his opinion recorded in the
minutes of the Council of State, and he shall also have the right to advise
the President of the matter. If the illegality is of such a nature as to involve

a prosecution against a member of the Council of State . . . and if the

President orders such a prosecution to take place, it shall be carried out by
the Chancellor of Justice. If the President finds that there is no ground for
an indictment, the Chancellor of Justice shall be free to report on the case
to Parliament . . .
18 Discussion of "the peculiar Finnish system" appears in Kastari, Guarantees
of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Principle, in JAHIDUCH DES OFFENTLIcHEN RECHTS DEa GEGENWART 438, 450-52 (1964); Kastari, The Constitutional
Protection of Fundanental Rights in Finland, 34 TuL. L. REv. 695, 697 (1960).
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as the mode of presidential election during the years of World War II
and the legislative delegation of broad powers in times of crises."9
The watchmen's independence. Frequent and intimate association
between the Chancellor, and the President, the Ministers, and ministerial
staffs leads some Finnish lawyers to doubt the Chancellor's detachment.
Expressing a sentiment many others share, a leading constitutional
authority has written that the Chancellor serves the government of the
day "in much the same sense as does a so-called crown jurist, who
should be wholly objective, but who is frequently partisan in his representations." " The Chancellor's presence at Cabinet meetings, another
prominent scholar recently remarked, "covers the Government with a
cloak of what looks like legality-and of course that makes it very
difficult for him to admit later that he was looking out of the window
when legally dubious matters were being dealt with. Instead he defends himself by defending the Government."
Even so, direct clashes between the Chancellor and leading political
figures have occurred. Some years ago, for example, a Chancellor
persuaded the President that a Minister should be prosecuted because
he had improperly prepared a Cabinet working paper. More recently
a Chancellor prosecuted the directors of a government insurance fund
for authorizing low cost loans to build apartment houses in which some
of their friends (including fellow officials) hoped to reside. Among
the directors were the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, and the
President of the Supreme Administrative Court. Some, but not all,
of the defendants were fined. The Prime Minister resigned. When
fully examined in court, however, the affair seemed far less scandalous
and perhaps more "political" than at first had been supposed.
The very fact that the prosecution was initiated may show that
the Chancellor is indeed as independent as he is supposed to be. On
the other hand, the Chancellor who launched that prosecution was
turned out of office afterward upon reaching retirement age, although
a permissible extension of three years had been granted his predecessors.
When asked whether the insurance fund case had had any permanent
consequences, the former Chancellor glumly replied not long ago: "Yes.
I lost my job." If his appraisal is correct, future chancellors may be
unenthusiastic about demonstrating their detachment.
19 The need for constitutional procedure is finally determined not by the Chancellor, but by the Constitutional Committee of Parliament, which is said to be quicker
than the Chancellor to discern possible incompatibility between a Cabinet proposal
and the Constitution. The Constitutional Committee, the bulk of whose members
are not lawyers, utilizes the services of a board of consultants, highly respected
jurists whose advice has been closely followed.
20 Kastari, The Parliamentary Ombudsman: His Functions, Position, and Relation to the Chancellor of Justice in Finland,28 INT'L REV. OF ADMIISTRATIVE SclziqC

391, 394 (1962).
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The Ombudsman, who is less closely linked with the executive
branch, is presumably uninhibited in dealing with transgressors in high
places, though he must have Parliament's consent before he can
prosecute a Minister personally. In 1952 the Ombudsman, acting on
his own initiative, went before Parliament (where he has the privilege
of the floor) to seek the indictment of two Cabinet members and two
former Ministers for imprudent use of public funds to the advantage
of a private business enterprise with which one of them was connected.
After lengthy parliamentary consideration, prosecution was authorized.
The Cabinet members immediately resigned their offices. The Ombudsman himself served as prosecutor. Two of the four defendants
were convicted. The prominence of those whom the Ombudsman had
denounced underscored his unconcern for governmental sensibilities.
Soon afterward, a high ranking official of the Defense Ministry,
who had his minister's support, was dismissed and deprived of pension
rights after prosecution by the Ombudsman. Only a few years ago the
Ombudsman caused a flurry when he gave a sharp "reminder" to the
Minister of Justice about his legal duties. Since the Minister happened
to have been the Ombudsman at an earlier period in his own career,
he received the rebuke with rather marked ill grace.
Episodes like these do not prove that the Ombudsman is totally
immune from pressures to which the Chancellor is exposed. They do
perhaps suggest, however, that detachment from the executive branch
frees the Ombudsman from the personal pangs and embarrassments
the Chancellor might feel when attacking an old colleague.

IV.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE COURTS

The watchmen's duty to safeguard legality is all inclusive. Both
the Ombudsman and the Chancellor are required to concern themselves
with judges as well as with other law administrators. Since, however,
"judicial independence" is valued in Finland"2 as elsewhere, a nice
line must be drawn between supervision, which is regarded as a Good
Thing, and interference, which is of course Bad.
Judicial organization. Seventy-three rural district courts and
thirty-five city courts, manned by two hundred professional judges, are
responsible for the trial of civil and criminal cases. Four courts of
appeal, with a total of seventy-five judges, hear appeals. The Supreme
Court, with a president and no fewer than twenty-one members who
21 FINLAND"CONST. art. 2 provides in part that "The judicial power shall be
FINLAND CONST. art. 91 forbids ousting
exercised by independent tribunals . . ."
a judge "except by a lawful trial and judgment" and also forbids transferring him to
another post without his consent, except as part of a general reorganization of the
judiciary.
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sit in three sections, has final appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal
matters.
The Supreme Administrative Court-a president and no fewer
than thirteen nor more than twenty-five members-has comprehensive
power to decide administrative appeals, not only from the decisions of
inferior administrative authorities and from the "provincial courts" to

which later reference will be made 22 but also from the decisions of the
highest authorities including the Council of State.'
In addition, professional judges are part of the personnel attached
to specialized tribunals such as military courts, water courts, and a
social insurance court. Steps have been successfully taken to reduce
the risk of political favoritism in selecting the judiciary.'
The professional judiciary is generally respected.
Access to Finland's well-manned courts is neither difficult nor
costly. Filing fees are very low. A litigant need not engage an
advocate (a status that had been attained in 1964 by only 330 lawyers
throughout the entire country 25 ) nor one of the two or three hundred
practitioners of lesser rank.2" Instead he may appear in his own
22 See
23See

pp. 344-45 infra.
Merikoski, Legality in Administrative Law, 4 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
LAW 127, 138-40 (1960); Uotila, Improving Public Administration in Finland, 27
INT'L REV. OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE 1 (1961).
Decisions of the Cabinet and
ministries are appealable only on legal grounds, while appeals against the exercise
of discretion (as well as on legal grounds) can be considered when other administrative authorities are involved. Professor Merikoski's study shows that recognition of
the Cabinet's discretionary powers does not greatly limit the court. From 1932 to
1955 the Supreme Administrative Court received 106,123 appeals, of which it transferred only 726 to the Cabinet because they involved the exercise of discretion. Of
these, more than half (389) had to do with peddlers' licenses. The use of motor
vehicles provided the next largest number. Others had to do with such epochal
matters as appointments of doormen at cafes and permission to take crayfish from
public waters for breeding purposes. Merikoski, supra at 142.
24The President of the Republic has been authorized by article 87 of the Constitution to appoint the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. He also appoints the members of the Supreme Court and the presidents of the courts of appeal, but only upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court.
Similarly, the Supreme Administrative Court recommends the persons whom the
President appoints to sit in that body. The Supreme Court recommends the appointees
to the courts of appeal, and it directly appoints many of the lower court judges and
the chairmen of other courts. City court members are elected by the appropriate
municipal council, usually on party lines, but sometimes with considerable reliance
on the
judiciary's advice.
25
THE UNION OF FINNISH LAWYERS, LAW AND LAWYERS IN FINLAND 5 (1964).
26

THE UNION OF FINNISH LAWYERS, THE FUTURE SUPPLY OF LAWYERS IN FINLAND AND THE DEMAND FOR THEIR SERVICES 17-18 (1960), shows the following occu-

pational distribution of the 3,670 Finnish lawyers who were professionally active
in 1957:
Private law practice
561
Judiciary
636
National administration
1252
Local administration
229
Commerce and industry
736
Organizational activity
146
Law teaching
51
Other
59
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behalf or through any representative he may choose. In matters related
to public administration, personal hearings before the courts are a
rarity since most issues are determined on the basis of the relevant
papers without the necessity of briefs or arguments on behalf of the
appellant.
In circumstances so favorable to affected persons' use of appellate
judicial processes whenever dissatisfied, one might suppose that the
judges could cure their own aberrations without external policing.
Finland apparently believes otherwise. The Chancellor devotes much
attention to the judges. For many years the Ombudsman, though
equally empowered to delve into the functioning of the judiciary, seemingly regarded that field as already occupied. Since 1962, however,
the Ombudsman has been taking a noticeably keener interest in the
courts.
Prosecuting the judges. A Special Prosecutor who is appointed
by the Supreme Court with the Chancellor's concurrence is attached
to each of the four courts of appeal. His task is to proceed against
lower court judges in suitable instances."'
Prosecutions of judges are not at all rare. Sixty-one prosecutions
were begun against judges in 1960; in 1961, the figure was eightynine; in 1962, ninety; in 1963, one hundred and forty-eight; in 1964,
one hundred and eighteen. Few of these were for serious offenses.
Most of them fell within section 40.21 of the Finnish Penal Code: "An
official who commits an error in office through carelessness, omission,
imprudence, lack of understanding, or lack of skill shall be sentenced to
a fine or suspension from duty unless the error be so minor that a
reminder be deemed the appropriate sanction; if the circumstances
warrant, he may be removed from office."
A substantial portion of the prosecutions derives from routine
review of periodic reports showing sentences imposed and fines collected in each court. The Deputy Chancellor and his subordinates
examine these to detect errors, whether or not appeals have been
taken.2' A judicial blunder sufficient to cause an eyebrow to lift
brings prosecution of the erring judge.s
27
He also conducts prosecutions of higher level nonjudicial administrators when
directed to do so by either the Chancellor or the Ombudsman.
28 Both the Chancellor and the Ombudsman are authorized by law to attend the
executive sessions of any and all courts. Neither one of them ever exercises this
power, however.
29 In 1960, 44 of the 61 prosecutions of judges were initiated upon the basis of
this routinized examination by the Chancellor's staff of lists the judges were required
to file. The comparable numbers in later years were as follows:
23: 89
1961
19: 90
1962
47:148
1963
20:118
1964
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Most other prosecutions are based upon errors discerned by a
court of appeal (or, more rarely, the Supreme Court) when reviewing
a lower court's judgment. The Special Prosecutor, who also reviews
the "prisoner lists" and "fine lists" supplied by the trial judges, commences a number of cases on his own motion. Very rarely a more
serious episode comes to light, usually through information communicated to the Chancellor; a few years ago, for example, a judge
was prosecuted and dismissed because he had exacted improper fees
for judicial proceedings and another judge lost his job when insobriety
affected his courtroom demeanor.
The very frequency of prosecutions may reduce their significance.
One of the court of appeal prosecutors, himself a former judge, commented flatly: "A conviction does not affect a judge's career. Of course
if he committed an offense knowingly, that would be another matter.
And I suppose a judge would have a dim future if he were frequently
prosecuted, because this would suggest habitually sloppy work or
mental laziness. Prosecutions do, however, keep judges on their
mark because a mistake may hit them in the pocketbook." 3o
Some judges, however, appraise prosecutions more harshly than
did the prosecutor. A distinguished jurist recently recalled with some
asperity that he himself, when a very young judge, had been prosecuted
for imposing too severe a fine upon a petty lawbreaker. "I paid back
the extra amount as soon as the mistake was called to my attention,"
he said, "but nobody could pay back to me the shame of being
prosecuted." Another judge, highly regarded in legal circles, remarked
that judges were under scrutiny too constantly, although he fully
favored having some checks upon his own and his colleagues' work.
"Our trouble," he declared, "is that everybody is supervising us. The
country would be better off if some one body, whether it be the court
of appeal or its prosecutor or the Chancellor or the Ombudsman, had
the entire responsibility. And some way should be found for detecting
and correcting mistakes without this constant prosecuting. If prosecution were reserved for big things, it would be a real whip instead of a
damned irritation."
In general, however, the present system seems to be accepted
resignedly. The newspapers pay no attention at all to the routine
prosecution of judges. A leading law professor, interviewed in the
company of an appellate judge and a practicing lawyer, asserted with
their seeming accord that a judge is unhurt by a prosecution, which is
30

As in other Scandinavian countries, Finland imposes fines on a sliding scale
related to income; a fine means losing a stated proportion of a certain number of
days' wages or salary. Instead of being subjected to a fine after being convicted, a
judge may simply be given a "reminder", which is in effect a censure without financial
consequences, though of course it remains as a blot on the judge's record.
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"more in the nature of a nuisance than a real embarrassment." Other
judges with whom the matter was discussed expressed similar views.
They insist, too, that they ignore the Chancellor's opinions unless based
upon explicit statutory provisions of acknowledged relevance. Supreme
Court judges recount with satisfaction their rebuff to the Chancellor a
few years ago when he criticized them for increasing the severity of a
sentence imposed by a lower court without affording the defendant an
opportunity to be heard. "We had the power to do so, and it was none
of his business if we chose to exercise it," a member of the Supreme
Court recently declared with strong feeling. "If the Chancellor thought
we were doing wrong, let him try to prosecute us. He didn't dare do
that. So he should have kept his thoughts to himself, and that is what
we told him." a'

Analysis of the list of those prosecuted during a recent three year
period shows that most of the judicial defendants were inexperienced
young men presiding over rural assizes. Some, indeed, were serving
their initial apprenticeship immediately after completing law studies.
Prosecution is a rather harsh means of supervising the work of novices
and of providing inservice training. It may also be inefficient, for
knowledge that a punishment has been imposed is not formally communicated to other judges, who may therefore fail to learn of their colleague's sad experience unless they hear about it from gossips. The
present system, as traditionally administered by the Chancellor, puts a
high premium on attention to detail in recording the sentencing of
penal offenders, but virtually overlooks the rest of judicial work. No
attention at all seems to be paid to the administration of civil justice,
save as the appellate courts may deal with erroneous judgments from
which an appeal has been taken."2
Beyond argument, a judge should never impose fines and jail
terms that exceed the limits provided by law, and of course a court's
records should be up to date and accurate. These are not the entirety
of good judging, however. The Chancellor's fixation on those phases
of judicial work may have nurtured legality in a narrow sense, but it
has also been deadening in a way. Great judging requires soaring
spirit far more than it requires devotion to the clerical detail which now
fills so large a part of a Finnish judge's life."8
31 In this instance, it is only fair to add, the Chancellor had the last word. In
1963 Parliament amended the law to require the hearing the Chancellor had recommended.
32 The court of appeal's special prosecutor periodically "inspects" trial courts,
but all agree that, until now, these inspections have concerned themselves almost
exclusively with fiscal matters, notably the accounting of proceeds of sales of tax
stamps that must be affixed to various formal documents. This is but another symptom of the somewhat mechanistic approach taken to "supervision" of judges' work.
33 Conversation with judges in small cities has produced this composite picture
of a trial judge's work week: He sits in court to hear cases for one day, from ten

340

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:327

Reopening closed cases. Both the Ombudsman and the Chancellor
have a second major activity in relation to the judiciary. When a
judgment has become final and no longer appealable because time
limitations have been exceeded, either of these two officers may request the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court (as the
case may be) to annul the prior decision and to reconsider the matter.
The request may be based on newly acquired evidence or on equitable
considerations. These cases are to be differentiated from the far more
numerous interventions in matters still open to the conventional
processes of review or appeal.
The Chancellor filed an average of 102 petitions to annul and
reconsider during the five years 1960-1964, inclusive; ninety-five
percent of his requests were found to be meritorious. The Ombudsman's similar requests were far less numerous, and somewhat less well
received by the two supreme courts.
In these cases the Chancellor and the Ombudsman function as
protagonists of legality rather than of the affected parties, for they
may act quite without reference to the parties' own wishes."4 The
Ombudsman's cases pertain to official or judicial omissions or maladroitness that have produced still correctible injustice. 5 In matters
of these kinds, however, the Ombudsman and the Chancellor may be
said to work as investigators for the courts, rather than as investigators
of the courts. Petitions which in other countries might be addressed
directly to judges are usually, in Finland, first sifted by these high nonuntil five. He spends the next day and perhaps a portion of the following day preparing "protocols," or records of the matters heard. He devotes two days to compiling lists and reports of all kinds. In most places he is inadequately assisted by
clerical staff or typists, and in some places by none at all. As one judge of fifteen
years' experience observed, "It's a very dull job." And as a youthful assistant added:
"The only thing I am sure of learning here is how to type."
34 In 1958, for example, the Chancellor successfully petitioned for cancellation
of a final divorce decree, obtained by the parties' collusion. The wife of a high
military official had committed an embezzlement and was about to be exposed. To
avoid endangering the husband's social standing, the couple falsely testified that they
had been separated for more than two years and that cause for divorce existed. The
Chancellor, as the nation's chief prosecutor, prosecuted the couple for perjury and,
as guardian of legality, asked the Supreme Court to annul the decree of divorce.
S5Examples from the Ombudsman's 1963 report: (1) A court imposed a fine
on Y.E.K. for disobeying a summons to stand trial. On the date set for trial Y.E.K.
was in detention elsewhere. His request to be transported to court had been denied
by his jailer, who had been unable to confirm the prisoner's statement that he had
been summoned. On the Ombudsman's request, the Supreme Court reopened Y.E.K.'s
case and set aside the fine previously imposed. (2) A.H. was convicted of a crime,
and was sentenced to pay a fine and damages. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
Subsequently, the Ombudsman became persuaded that A.H. had been mentally irresponsible when the criminal acts had been committed. The Supreme Court agreed,
and the judgment against A.H. was set aside. From the 1962 report: A.D., held in
prison following his conviction, requested that the minutes of his trial be sent to him
there so that he could appeal. The papers reached the prison on the day after A.D.
had been released from detention. Instead of being forwarded to A.D., they were
returned to the court. Before A.D. had obtained the minutes, the time to appeal
had expired. At the Ombudsman's request, the time for taking an appeal was
extended.
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judicial officials. Petitions found meritorious are passed along to one
of the appropriate supreme tribunals, which retains full power to decide
what, if anything, should next be done.
V. RELATIONSHIP TO NONJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

The watchmen's overlapping duties. The Chancellor and the
Ombudsman share the duty and the power to oversee all branches of
governmental administration, at every level from the lowliest clerk of
a rural commune to the loftiest military officer or central bureau chief.
In order to balance workloads somewhat, Parliament has made the
Ombudsman primarily responsible for safeguarding legality in the
military services and in places of detention. The Chancellor, while
still capable of dealing with complaints about those matters, in fact
passes them along to the Ombudsman. Otherwise, the two watchmen
have an overlapping duty to enforce official compliance with law 3 6
Despite the broad opportunity thus presented for conflict between
these high offices, no friction seems to have occurred. Past and present
office holders have stated that neither of the officials will deal with a
complaint already under study by the other. While they could act
successively upon the same matter and have occasionally done so
wittingly or unwittingly, they have so rarely reached contrary conclusions that specific examples of discord could not be recalled during
interviews in 1964. The harmony of their opinions and actions is
seemingly spontaneous; the Chancellor and the Ombudsman do not
consult one another regularly, though conversations occurred at one
time between the then office holders who happened to be friends of
long standing. Each ordinarily goes his separate way without informing the other. Good judgment or good luck has thus far prevented
any collisions.3
36The Chancellor has the responsibility, unshared by the Ombudsman, of being
Supreme Public Prosecutor; in that capacity he supervises all public prosecutors
throughout the land, other than the Ombudsman himself (so far as that official may
be regarded as a prosecutor). Periodic reports are submitted to the Chancellor,
showing in detail the actions taken in each prosecutor's office. These sometimes reveal
mistakes which lead to a reprimand or a prosecution of a prosecutor. Prosecutors
turn to the Chancellor for advice when in doubt whether a prosecutable offense has
been made out by the evidence at hand. Either the Chancellor or the Ombudsman
can order that a prosecution be initiated. Interestingly, however, neither can override
a prosecutor's decision to prosecute; the prosecutor's belief about where his duty lies
must be given full play, though the prosecutor may later suffer if his belief be regarded
by the Chancellor as too glaringly ill founded. Moreover, the Chancellor has a
so-called "absolute power of devolution," which means that he can himself supplant
a prosecutor in a pending case and can assume personal responsibility for it. By
exercising the power of devolution, the Chancellor could conceivably take over a
prosecution of which he disapproved, and could then proceed to drop it.
371n its 1920 instructions to the Ombudsman (still in force today), Parliament
told him that he was not to "interfere with the activities of the Chancellor." No
similar words were addressed to the Chancellor concerning his "interfering" with
the Ombudsman, but the absence of such an instruction has made no discernible
difference in the officers' relationships.
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In respect of public administration in general, both the Chancellor and the Ombudsman may investigate on the basis of specific
complaints, upon their own initiative, or through personal inspections
of institutions or offices. If they detect improprieties they may admonish, prosecute, or seek disciplinary measures as circumstances may
suggest.
VI.

COMPLAINTS

Sources and volume of cases. While in theory the Ombudsman
is "the people's man," the public at large seems to prefer dealing with
the Chancellor.
In terms of numbers alone, the Ombudsman is the leader. In
1963, for example, the Ombudsman received 1,029 complaints, as
against only 479 complaints addressed to the Chancellor (who referred
seventy-three of these to the Ombudsman because they dealt with the
military services or places of detention) ; in 1962 the respective figures
were 753 and 598 (of which 105 were transferred to the Ombudsman).
These gross figures are, however, somewhat misleading for two
reasons. First, in each of the years about seventy additional cases went
to the Chancellor (but none to the Ombudsman) from other organs of
government which had learned of seeming delinquencies through complaints by the public or through their own observation. Second, and
more significant in the present context, the Ombudsman drew most of his
complaints from a very small segment of the entire population, namely,
prisoners in various places of detention. Persons interviewed in
1964 insistently repeated that the Ombudsman has chiefly been of use
to those held in penal institutions. Among those who expressed this
view were spokesmen for business groups, local governments, welfare
officers, lawyers, trade unions, and civil servants. Even patients in
mental institutions, who are eager "clients" of ombudsmen in other
countries, infrequently complain to the Ombudsman in Finland. Officials of the Medical Board remarked simply: "The Ombudsman is not
well known to the people at large. Our patients," they added with just a
touch of pride, "complain to President Kekkonen himself."
The experience of the large Riihimdiki penitentiary, in which only
first offenders are confined, somewhat confirms the opinion that the
general public is little aware of the Ombudsman. Riihimiki inmates,
fresh from civilian life as it were, rarely write the Ombudsman though
free to do so without prison censorship: 'But a prison official observed
that "the volume of complaints from the nearly forty percent of these
same men who, unfortunately, will be back in some other prison increases
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very dramatically as they become 'better educated' by being confined
along with older, more experienced convicts. The Ombudsman's word
of mouth advertising occurs chiefly behind bars, I am sorry to say."
Because statements concerning Finnish experience were inconsistent with observations made in other countries, objective verification
was sought by ascertaining the identity of two hundred complainants
plucked at random from the Ombudsman's list for the year 1962. Of
these two hundred (some of whom filed several complaints in the
course of the year), one hundred twenty-five were prisoners of one
sort or another; sixty-four might be described as "ordinary citizens";
six were conscripts who objected to treatment by their military superiors; three were school teachers; one was a lawyer; and one was a
member of Parliament. This sample strongly supports the opinion
that the Ombudsman is much more "the prisoners' man" than "the
people's man."
Yet, when that has been said, one still notes that thirty-seven and
one half percent of the Ombudsman's cases came from persons not in
detention. This is a substantial share of the whole. The present
Ombudsman, more actively than most of his predecessors, has encouraged school teachers to expand their students' awareness of his
existence. Perhaps in time his office will gain fuller recognition than
it has thus far had.
Even now, complaints to the Ombudsman are becoming diversified. Civil servants have little need for his services in personnel matters
such as dismissal or disciplinary action, because these are cognizable
by specific tribunals to which access is easy. Their organizations have,
however, recently turned to the Ombudsman to enforce higher public
officials' duty to bargain collectively. They have also encouraged
their members to complain about systematic evasions of personnel regulations by local authorities. Municipal officials have complained
against what they regard as overbearing conduct by central offices.
Despite the organized businessmen's view that the Ombudsman is of no
direct use to them, individual businessmen do in fact complain, as
has happened for example in connection with the award of bus franchises and the denial of certain licenses. Though practicing lawyers
say the Ombudsman is useful only to poor people who cannot pay for
professional advice, some lawyers do approach him in behalf of clients,
perhaps especially in connection with complaints of wide application.
Thus an attorney, acting for a client, was recently successful in complaining to the Ombudsman about policemen's having off-duty private
employment regarded as objectionable because of potential conflicts
of interests.
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Complaints to provincial courts. One very good reason, indeed
perhaps the main reason, why neither the Ombudsman nor the Chancellor is overwhelmed by citizens' complaints is that grievances are
readily redressed elsewhere, notably in the "provincial courts." These
tribunals, at least one of which sits in each province, are catch-all
appellate bodies. They are not regarded in Finland as full fledged
courts because they may be (but rarely are) presided over by the
provincial governor, and because the three members in each of these
tribunals may be assigned purely administrative duties when not fully
occupied by judicial work. They function in fact, however, in the
same spirit and manner as courts, although their judgments issue in
the form of decisions of the provincial administrations in whose name
they act. When a citizen's views clash with those of lesser officials
(and, after all, most officials with whom citizens come in frequent
contact are within the category of "lesser"), the provincial courts are in
a position to resolve the clash dispassionately, for the members of those
courts have only tenuous links with the administrators. 3 8 With few
exceptions, provincial courts' judgments are further reviewable in the
Supreme Administrative Court.3 9
The provincial courts do more than siphon off bona fide grievances
of individual citizens. They serve also as a forum for the airing of
local controversies that might lose their point if they were removed to
distant Helsinki for examination by the Ombudsman or Chancellor.
Complaints against local officials are within the jurisdiction of both
those high dignitaries, but neither one receives many of this type. They
are much more likely to find their way to the provincial courts. In
one rapidly growing town, a few determined traditionalists have taken
nearly thirty cases to the provincial court during each of the past
several years, seeking thus to prevent or at least postpone an urbanization they deplore. In the larger city of Turku, an elected official cheerfully commented: "Every time our Council meets, you can be sure
that somebody will complain to the provincial court the next day, with
copies to the local newspapers. Usually this is just a partisan tactic,
having little to do with either legality or efficiency. I sometimes wish
we were in the position of the Helsinki municipal council, which does
38 The statistics of the three provincial courts that sit in Turku will serve to
exemplify the absence of pro-official bias. In 1963 these three tribunals disposed of
5,287 cases. Of these, 369 were dismissed because of untimeliness or nonprosecution
by the appellant. In the 4,918 decisions on the merits, the initial administrative decision
was reversed or modified in 2,663 cases, the matter was remanded for further proceedings in 334 cases, and the challenged decision was affirmed in 1,921 cases. Reversals, modifications, and remands thus constituted more than 60% of the courts'
decisions. This is said to be a typical year's record.
39 See pp. 336-37 mtpra.
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its work month after month without anybody's noticing it at all. But
on the other hand ours is a relatively painless way of conducting
political warfare."
Complaints to local prosecutors. Finally, citizens may and do
complain directly to local prosecutors concerning asserted misbehavior
by other officials. Prosecutors, unlike the Ombudsman and the Chancellor, cannot "give a reminder" to an official in the form of a reprimand
or advice for the future. They can only prosecute wrongdoers. In
an informal manner, nevertheless, they do sometimes chide a public
servant for rudeness or lack of diligence without prosecuting him.
In this way, without ever putting a name to it, they do in fact though
not in theory give a reminder from time to time.
Complaints to prosecutors in the more populous provinces are
said to average about five a week, while other and even pettier cases
occasionally go to prosecutors in the cities and towns. These usually
pertain to isolated acts of clear though not easily proved impropriety
(such as use of excessive force by an arresting policeman) or to delay
in handling papers. Altogether, the eleven provincial prosecutors probably deal with no more than 1500 complaints per year. Whatever the
precise figure may be, the provincial prosecutors do unquestionably
handle many cases that could have been referred to the Chancellor or
the Ombudsman had the complainants so chosen. This fact is clearly
reflected in judicial statistics showing the total number of prosecutions
of judges and officials (other than military personnel) during the
years 1960-1964, inclusive. The courts during these five years entertained an average of 222 prosecutions against public servants. Of
these, only 132 at the very most were (on the average) commenced at
the behest of the Ombudsman, the Chancellor, or the special prosecutors
of the four courts of appeal, leaving a balance of ninety that may be
attributed to other prosecutors' responses to the complaints made
directly to them."0
40 The pertinent figures from which the above conclusions are drawn may be
summarized as follows:
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Total prosecutions commenced
183
191
221
273
243
Prosecutions of judges
61
89
90
148
118
Other prosecutions by Chancellor
27
24
18
16
20
Other prosecutions by Ombudsman
11
15
9
6
9

Some of the "other prosecutions" attributed to the Chancellor and the Ombudsman probably in fact include a few cases involving judges and may therefore already
have been included under the heading "Prosecutions of judges."
In addition to the cases involving civilian officials, civilian courts entertained the
following numbers of prosecutions directed against military personnel for what might
be called official misconduct: 1960, 17; 1961, 15; 1962, 10; 1963, 14.
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The processing of complaints. Neither the Ombudsman nor the
Chancellor has a large staff. Two full time and six part time assistants
are available to the Ombudsman.41 The Chancellor is aided by a
Deputy Chancellor, who can act in his place in matters the Chancellor
chooses, and by six full time staff lawyers and one part time assistant.
Seventy to eighty percent of the staff's time is devoted to complaint
work, most of which is supervised by the Deputy Chancellor, while the
Chancellor concentrates on Cabinet matters and his duties as Supreme
Public Prosecutor. In contrast the Ombudsman personally reviews
the final action on every complaint, whether that action be a letter
rejecting the complaint or a decision to prosecute.4
Both offices tend to ask for files in a great many cases, in order
to ascertain the facts when complaints cannot be dismissed out of
hand. This process is time consuming. Although less cumbersome
means of checking the accuracy of a complainant's statements could be
devised, neither office has encouraged its staff members to proceed
informally or to take any great personal initiative. Neither office has
the time or the resources for interviewing witnesses or conducting anything resembling trial hearings when conflicting evidence exists; under
Finnish law, in fact, taking testimony under oath is impossible except
in formal proceeding in tribunals. Local police officers and, infrequently, magistrates are pressed into service as field investigators, to
take statements from persons who may have relevant information. Even
when the conduct of policemen is the very fact in issue, the Ombudsman
can command the help of no investigators other than the defendant's
fellow officers. While the Chancellor can request a local prosecutor to
investigate in his behalf, the ties between prosecutors and police are
even closer in Finland than in the United States, and sometimes the
head of the police force and the prosecutor are one and the same.
Before "giving a reminder" or otherwise making a finding that
might adversely reflect on the person complained against, both the
Chancellor and the Ombudsman afford him a chance to explain or
41Because the demand for lawyers exceeds the supply now available in Finland
and because the salaries attached to some positions are unrealistically low, the holding
of multiple jobs is not unusual. This sometimes has consequences of uncertain merit.
One of the Ombudsman's assistants is also employed in the Ministry of the Interior,
which administers police affairs. Complaints to the Ombudsman concerning police
administration are likely to be referred to this staff member because of his specialized
background, which the Ombudsman deems an asset. The director of the national
police force praises the Ombudsman's sound understanding of police problems, based
on good advice received from his part time assistant. The possibility of divided loyalties has apparently not suggested itself as yet to the Ombudsman, the police director,
or the staff assistant
42
Parliament elects a Deputy Ombudsman, who serves only when the Ombudsman is on leave or is incapacitated. He thus adds no numerical strength to the
Ombudsman's staff.
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object-not a formal hearing but, rather, an opportunity to justify,
excuse, or minimize 8
Action on complaints. Predictably, most complaints prove to be
unfounded. Dissatisfaction with an official's action may be perfectly
genuine and yet have no justification. During a four year period,
1960-1963, action favorable to the complainant's position was taken in
only 8.6 percent of complaint cases disposed of by the Ombudsman.
In 1964, when many old cases were concluded without positive action
upon the complaints, the figure fell to five percent.

TABLE

I. OMBUDSMAN'S ACTIONS ON COMPLAINTS

Total of cases decided
No action found appropriate
because
i) matter pending in court
ii) situation changed
iii) matter outside Ombudsman's jurisdiction
iv) insufficiently persuasive
evidence
v) no error apparent
vi) miscellaneous reasons
Action taken in support
of complaint
by
i) prosecution
ii) disciplinary proceedings
iii) admonition to official
iv) suggestion or instruction
for future guidance
v) official himself took
suitable action after
Ombudsman's inquiry
43

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
955 947 805 787 1513
871 865 730 727 1437
32
8

19
22

30
7

29
5

28
8

42

36

38

88

112

136
496
23

232
1003
54

84

82

75

60

76

21

15

14

10

14

30

30

15

20

26

Parliament has instructed the Ombudsman, before commencing a prosecution,
to give to the affected person "the possibility, if he so wishes, to present his opinion
in the matter in a given time." The comparable instructions to the Chancellor say
that if investigation of a complaint shows that an official action is "against law or
otherwise erroneous, the guilty person, if not already heard in the matter, shall have
an opportunity to submit an explanation and thereafter he will be legally prosecuted
if the error is not of such nature that the matter can be concluded by a reminder
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During the four year period, 1960-1963, only 5.7 percent of the
citizens' complaint cases handled by the Chancellor were found to be
meritorious.
TABLE

II.

CHANCELLOR'S ACTIONS ON CITIZENS' COMPLAINTS

Total of cases decided
No action found appropriate
because
i) matter pending in court
ii) obviously trivial
iii) within another official's
competence
iv) no impropriety found
Action taken in support
of complaint
by
i) prosecution
ii) disciplinary proceedings or
admonition to official
iii) suggestion or instruction
for future guidance
iv) official himself took
suitable action after
Chancellor's inquiry

1960 1961 1962 1963
635
539
493
406
591
512
467 385
10
22

5
9

6
4

2
3

29
530

26
472

20
437

20
360

44

27

26

21

6

7

7

4

13

8

8

8

14

8

9

9

11

4

2

0

Negative action on a complaint, however, does not necessarily
leave the complainant wholly dissatisfied, for the communications he
receives from the Ombudsman or the Chancellor sometimes enable
him to understand and perhaps accept a decision previously resisted.
One senses, however, that the Finnish watchmen of legality do not
take as great care as their Scandinavian counterparts to enlighten
complainants.
The tables set forth above do not show the totality of the watchmen's work. Some of that work is not responsive to complaints, but
is wholly self-initiated. The tables omit, too, those complaints initiated
not by the public at large but by the Cabinet, one of the superior courts,
or some other official. During the years 1960-1963, 80.5 percent of
these complaints led to some form of action by the Chancellor, as against
the 5.7 percent of citizens' complaints which produced positive results.
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TABLE

III. CHANCELLOR'S ACTIONS ON OFFICIALS' COMPLAINTS

1960
Total of cases decided
123
No action found appropriate
22
because
i) evidence inconclusive
8
ii) no merit on face of complaint 10
iii) should be referred elsewhere
3
iv) settled otherwise
1
Action taken in support
of complaint
101
by
i) prosecution
6
ii) disciplinary proceedings or
admonition to official
2
iii) suggestion or instruction
for future guidance

93

1961
71
20

1962
70
14

1963
69
9

8
8
1
3

7
3
4
0

1
5
3
0

51

56

60

2

2

2

7

1

2

42

53

56

While the number of cases leading to corrective actions against
individual officials remains small, many administrators testify that the
Ombudsman's and Chancellor's investigation of complaints has substantial preventive effect. One high ranking prison administrator, for example, believes that the behavior patterns of guards has been greatly
affected by their knowledge that prisoners have ready access to the
Ombudsman. Further, his own administration has often been influenced by the Ombudsman's suggestions that aim at eliminating
future complaints. "We do not always think the Ombudsman is right,
but if he feels strongly about the way things should be done, we go
along with him as a practical matter. At the same time," he added,
"the Ombudsman listens to us, too. Before he criticizes, he gives us a
chance to discuss; and after discussion he has changed his mind occasionally, just as we have. As a matter of fact we senior officials are
glad the Ombudsman exists. He takes a lot of cranks off our backs,
because they write to him instead of continuing to badger us. And he
helps us superintend a scattered staff. We can't keep our eyes on
them continuously no matter how hard we might try. They know,
though, that the Ombudsman may be watching when we are not, and
they take him seriously."
Police officials in widely separated cities were in accord that the
Ombudsman's and the Chancellor's occasional fault finding did have a
continuing impact upon policemen's conduct. "We have not had a
single prosecution or reminder during my eleven years here," said the
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chief of police in an industrial city, "and I hope we can keep it that
way. But we have had inquiries about matters that had been sent to
the Chancellor or the Ombudsman, and so we are well aware that
complaints can be made. Of course, too, we have all heard about the
prosecution of K. [a police chief in another city] for unnecessarily
keeping a sick man in jail. That is very much on our minds because
we have not in the past had any good system for dealing with sick
prisoners. After what happened to K. we can't continue to be easy
going. We are working on that problem right this minute."
Another senior official, commenting on proceedings initiated by
the Chancellor as well as the Ombudsman, remarked that even a "reminder" growing out of a prosecution remains on a policeman's record
as a black mark until it has been expunged by five years of unblemished
service. It impedes promotion and preferment. He was asked whether
he agreed with the opinion of one of his superiors that policemen's
conduct is not changed by the activities of the two official watchmen.
"Don't let anyone tell you," he advised, "that police officers don't care
about those fellows in Helsinki. We sometimes think they should
spend more time on bigger men than we are, because we already have
a lot of supervision over us and the bigshots don't. But we know
they can and do concern themselves with us, and that makes us
careful." "
In all likelihood, however, this kind of chain reaction to the handling of complaint cases does not occur with equal intensity throughout
the civil administration. An effort was made in 1964 to confirm the
supposition that the Ombudsman is especially useful in connection with
social welfare matters. Not a shred of evidence was found to support
that view. Officials familiar with both central and local administration
of laws concerning children, alcoholics, home relief recipients, maternal
welfare, and rehabilitation doubted that either the Chancellor or the
Ombudsman has had much of an impact on these features of the "welfare state." They agreed that supervision by the Ministry of Social
Affairs was energetic and respected and that many of their decisions
could be and were reviewed by the provincial courts as well. 45 They
agreed, too, that welfare administrators have actually been prosecuted
in the past for errors in administration. They simply rejected the idea
44

The speaker was no doubt correct in saying that awareness of the Ombudsman
encourages policemen to be careful, but of course carelessness does still exist. The
Ombudsman's report for 1963 reports a prosecution and fining of a police officer who
had failed to withdraw a "Wanted By The Police" notice after the person to whom
the notice referred was in fact no longer wanted; as a result the person referred to
was later picked up and detained briefly by police in another city. Another policeman was fined and ordered to pay damages because he had struck a person he had
arrested.
45 See p. 344 mtpra.
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that their work was likely to entangle them with the Ombudsman or the
Chancellor; it was not that they were undisciplined in their official
activities, but that their discipline and inspiration came from other
quarters.
"Huoltaja," a monthly magazine published by the Ministry
of Social Affairs, provides confirmation of a sort. This periodical,
whose pages are devoted to welfare questions of all kinds, is
sent to members of each "social board" in every community in the
nation. The issues of "Huoltaja" from January 1958 through September 1964-eighty-one issues in all-were leafed through in order
to find references to the Ombudsman. Only one such reference occurred throughout the entire period. The fact remains, nevertheless,
that the Ombudsman does receive a substantial number of complaints
pertaining to the work of welfare authorities, whether or not those
authorities are sensitive to what affects them.4"
VII. ACTION ON OWN INITIATIVE
Neither the Chancellor nor the Ombudsman must wait for complaints. Both can and to some extent do take up matters on their
own initiative.
The figures available in the Chancellor's office are unrevealing
because they show chiefly the results of the routine checking of judges'
and prosecutors' lists and reports, to which reference has been made
in previous pages 7 Conversations with the Chancellor's office suggest that other self-initiated cases are so rare as to be virtually nonexistent. As one staff member put it, "You can't rely on the newspapers for valuable leads. They are too inaccurate. If there is
anything really back of a news story, we think that sooner or later
someone will file a complaint. We are too overworked as it it without
going out to look for more cases."
The Ombudsman is more ready to look into possible problems
without first being asked. His annual reports show that he himself
initiated an annual average of about twenty-five inquiries apart from
4
GThe following figures are derived from the Ombudsman's annual reports for
the years 1960-1964, inclusive.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Complaints arising from orders to
be detained in a closed institution
(which would include alcoholic
treatment centers and work
homes in which nonsupporting
18
48
72
61
67
parents may be confined)
Complaints arising from other ac11
70
30
27
42
tions of welfare officials
47 See pp. 347-49 supra.
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inspections, which will be discussed in the following section. These
have led in each year to one prosecution or disciplinary proceeding,
an average of nine proposals to guide officials, and one corrective
action by an administrative body then under investigation.
One can sympathize with the Ombudsman's and the Chancellor's
reluctance to reach out for new business, since both offices have difficulty
in keeping abreast of their current workload. The Ombudsman's backlog of unfinished cases rose from 159 in 1960 to 174 in 1961, to 226
in 1962, and to 544 in 1963; but a determined effort reduced the number of pending matters to 245 at the end of 1964. The Chancellor's
backlog mounted from 150 in 1960, to 234 in 1961, and to 401 in
1962, then was reduced slightly to 359 at the end of 1963 and rose once
more to 373 in 1964.
The watchmen's unwillingness to proceed unless someone has
cried for help is, however, especially unfortunate in Finland. Parliament and its committees have no power under that country's Constitution to investigate administrative functioning. Citizens rarely call upon
their parliamentary representatives for assistance in dealing with government. In fact, after seven centuries of existence under foreign
domination, Finns tend not to be very outspoken about dissatisfactions;
even in ordinary commercial affairs, let alone governmental ones,
many Finns keep their grievances to themselves rather than articulate
them forthrightly. "Many of us Finns," a professor asserted recently,
"do not speak with open mouths." These circumstances should perhaps
caution the official watchmen against too heavy reliance on complaints
and too great detachment from the news and rumors of the day.
During a recent period the Helsinki newspapers gave great
prominence to two stories that would almost certainly have led ombudsmen elsewhere to launch an inquiry. A large hospital construction
contract had been awarded to the higher of two apparently equally
reputable bidders, the press declared. The unsuccessful bidder, perhaps fearful of antagonizing officials from whom future contracts might
be sought, seemed disinclined to contest the matter. Nobody complained to the Ombudsman or the Chancellor, and neither of them
initiated an investigation. In the second case, a schoolgirl had written
and published an article critical of her teachers. She was reprimanded
and slightly penalized by her school. The press, perhaps sensing an
issue of civil liberties, devoted considerable space to the teacher-pupil
controversy. The schoolgirl made no complaint, however, and there
the matter ended so far as the watchmen were concerned-though the
Central Board of Education subsequently reviewed the case on its own
motion and upheld the girl.
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These two episodes suggest what appears to be a general condition.
The watchmen are not invariably inert; at times, on the contrary, they
have strongly intervened upon their own motion." Still the unfolding
scene does not strongly attract their attention. Consequently they have
far less impact on society than does, say, the Swedish Ombudsman,
whose repeated interventions over the years have helped mold public
opinion concerning such diverse things as free speech, freedom of religion, police restrictions, and penology. 9 The Finnish watchmen,
ordinarily concentrating on the routine of law administration and relying on the initiative of complainants whose grievances may be relatively
insignificant, miss opportunities to provide social leadership in areas
where it seems needed.
VIII. INSPECTIONS

The Chancellor, who in earlier years personally inspected governmental offices throughout the nation, no longer has time to inspect
even offices of the prosecutors who are immediately subordinate to him.
The provincial prosecutors regularly visit, in his behalf, the prosecutors
and police administrators of the smaller units of government, and their
inspection is said to be thorough. The Chancellor's office as such,
however, inspects only reports that are filed with it. Hence the Chancellor may, in this context, be characterized as an inspector of documents.
The Ombudsman, by contrast, engages in extensive personal inspections of prisons, police headquarters, courts, and various institutions in scattered locations. His reports show a five year average of
seventy-two such inspections, ranging from a low of thirty in 1960 to a
high of ninety-six in 1962 and 1964."0 The present Ombudsman has
been a markedly more energetic traveler than his immediate
predecessor.
48 Upon the basis of press reports in 1963, for example, the Ombudsman inquired
into the assertedly inefficient functioning of a national educational examining body,
whose activities importantly affected many young persons. The administration of
the examinations and the publication of their results are said to have given far greater
satisfaction in 1964. An earlier Ombudsman had acted upon his own initiative to
denounce a work stoppage by civil servants-an action still hotly resented in some
circles. A former Chancellor asserts that he "looked into" all newspaper reports of
"scandal or wrongdoing," though this fact is not reflected in his annual reports. He
does point to the termination of a road race on highways near Helsinki after he had
called attention to its dangers. Another former Chancellor recalls the promulgation
of certain air transport regulations after he had raised questions about gaps in the
existing body of controls, a matter into which he had inquired because of a newspaper
article.
49 See Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman, 27 INT'L RV.
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ScIENc
243 (1961). Compare Gellhorn, supra note 3.
GOThese figures are slightly larger than those found elsewhere in the same reports
from which Table IV has been compiled. The discrepancy can be explained in this
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INSPECTIONS BY OMBUDSMAN

Nature of InstitutionInspected 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Prisons and work camps
15
7
8 12
11
Equipment for transporting
prisoners
0
0
3
3
0
Jails-city and town;
police lockups
Police stations-towns
Offices of Lnsman (police chief,
prosecutor, general law
administrator in less
populous districts)
Police-highway patrol stations
Welfare institutions
Welfare offices
Military installations
Border authorities
Provincial governments
Country judges
Offices of national administrative
organs
Municipal offices
Totals

30

43

96

93

96

These figures lose some of their luster, however, when one discovers that only twenty-four days including travel time were devoted to
the ninety-six inspections completed in 1962; the ninety-three inspections of 1963 required only thirty-four days, again including travel time;
and twenty-seven days sufficed for the ninety-six inspections in 1964.
Questions inescapably arise concerning the thoroughness and utility of
such hurried and random on-site studies of public administration.
When interrogated, officials who have been inspected in recent years
were unable to recall any benefits to them in terms of fresh attitudes
toward their work. The Ombudsman believes, nevertheless, that his
visits do have beneficial effects. He misses no opportunity to stress
the dangers of slowness in handling public business. In his opinion
this conversational emphasis has a real, though not precisely measurable
way: in one branch of his report the Ombudsman has counted as one inspection his
visiting several establishments under a single control, such as a visit to a police jail
in conjunction with a visit to the superior official responsible for the jail's administration; elsewhere, these have been listed as two separate inspections.
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influence, on the future behavior of the judges and other officials he
meets during his travels.
The Ombudsman has been specifically instructed by Parliament
to conduct "inspection tours in order to make himself acquainted with
matters pertaining to his official functions; he shall especially visit
prisons and ask for information about the care of prisoners as well as
other matters concerning them." "' This narrow focus is historically
explicable by the fact that many political prisoners were in detention
when the parliamentary instructions were formulated in 1920 and
concern about their treatment was widely felt. Continuing that same
focus today is less explicable. Finland has a modern and humane prison
administration.52 Technical inspectors frequently examine penal institutions of every type. The Ombudsman now seems to serve chiefly
a psychological purpose; prisoners like to talk with him about their
sentences and their family problems, and perhaps they occasionally
have something interesting to tell him about prison disciplinary practices or administrative problems other than the perennial favorite in
every institution, namely, food. No Ombudsman has asked for a
change in Parliament's instructions, although a nontraditionalist may
conclude some day that prison abuses can be controlled without forcing
the Ombudsman personally to spend so much time behind bars instead
of behind his desk.
The present Ombudsman's apparent intention of paying more
visits to military installations than did his predecessors is highly commendable. Finland, unlike Sweden and Norway, has no separate ombudsman to deal with problems of military personnel. Thus the legal
protection of soldiers as well as civilians is in the Ombudsman's hands.
Soldiers are entitled to write or speak to the Ombudsman without going
through military channels,53 but they rarely do so, possibly because they
may fear covert reprisals or perhaps simply because they are unaware
of their privilege.5 4 The Finnish army, somewhat Prussian in its
tradition, long resisted civilian intrusion. The Ombudsman is attempting to effect a change in attitude and to make his availability to military
personnel a reality instead of the myth it has largely been until now.
In 1963 he approached the General Staff, requesting that information
about the Ombudsman be included in the orientation program for
51

SERVICE REGULATIONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAx,

art. 10 (Jan. 10,

1920).
52 See,
53

e.g., Soine, Finland's Open Institutions,28 Fed. Probation, Dec. 1964, p. 19.
See Kastari, The ParliamentaryOmbudsman, 28 INT'L REv. OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ScmcE

391, 395 (1962).

by military authorities was involved in only five complaint cases throughSee Kastari, The Chancellor of Justice and the Ombudsman, in THE
OmUxDsMAN: CrrizEN's DEFENDER 65-66 (Rowat ed. 1965).
5Action

out 1963.
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recruits. His recent inspection trips to military bases have enabled
him to "show the flag" if nothing more.

IX.

PRESENTING GENERAL PROPOSALS

Both official watchmen have been instructed to note the need for
new laws and not to content themselves with enforcing those already
Both men have accordingly felt free to present general
enacted."
to
proposals the Cabinet, to individual ministers, and to the Parliament.
They have, in fact, acted somewhat as law reform commissions, calling
attention to desirable changes in fields that would not otherwise be
likely to attract much public notice. Thus, for example, the Chancellor
in late 1964 sent the Minister of Justice a number of suggested statutory clarifications bearing on criminal trials and sentencing procedures.
The frequency with which he had detected judicial errors in these areas
suggested that some of the fault might lie with poorly formulated laws
rather than with the men who had erroneously applied them.
In general, no more is done than to raise a question. The formulation of suitable legislation is left to others. Thus, in 1962, the
Ombudsman called the Ministry of Justice's attention to a complaint
received repeatedly from persons serving sentences in prison: they
thought they had not received proper credit for time spent in detention
after trial but before being transported to the penitentiary. The matter
had been handled by the Supreme Court as long ago as 1956, but the
decision was adverse to the prisoners' view. The flow of complaints
continued. The Ombudsman, after six years of responding to written
and oral grievances, finally wrote mildly: "Since the present condition
of affairs seems to me unsound, I feel it proper to bring the problem
to the Ministry's attention so that it can consider whether legislative
or other remedial steps should be taken."
In the same annual report the Ombudsman disclosed that the social
welfare administration had altered its explanation of a formula for
computing old age pensions. The change was made after the Ombudsman had told the administration that the explanatory wording
previously in use had raised false hope among pensioners and had
consequently spawned unnecessary complaints with which the Ombudsman had had to deal.
55 The instructions to the Ombudsman tell him (§ 8) to "point out imperfections
in Acts of Parliament and decrees as well as unclear or conflicting provisions, especially those that have caused various interpretations, hesitation, or other trouble
in jurisdiction or administration, and to make proposals for their elimination." The
instructions to the Chancellor say (§ 14) that if he has "noticed that the administration of law in some respect has caused criticism or that new legislation in some field
is necessary," he should express his opinion about such matters in his annual report
or otherwise.
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The Ombudsman and the Chancellor advance general proposals
rather diffidently."' They seem especially reluctant to frame fully
elaborated ideas for legislative study. In this they differ somewhat
from their colleagues elsewhere in Scandinavia, especially in Denmark,
where the Ombudsman sometimes presents his suggestions in such
detail that they may be readily incorporated in statutes or regulations.
The more modest Finnish approach has the virtue of leaving full
responsibility in the hands of those who are directly charged with
formulating legislative proposals. On the other hand, a suggestion
that a problem deserves to be considered is far less forceful than a
suggestion of a particularized solution.
Moreover, the watchmen's annual reports to Parliament, embodying their ideas for the future as well as their account of past activities,
do not arouse much excited attention. They are referred to the
Constitutional Committee, whose secretary masters their contents but
whose members are not thought to be extremely diligent readers. The
Ombudsman and the Chancellor are sometimes invited to confer with
the Committee informally. The Chancellor's reports are usually simply
received and approved without comment.
The Ombudsman includes in his report a list (sometimes very
lengthy) of parliamentary resolutions the Cabinet has not carried out
as expected. This has enabled the Constitutional Committee to inquire
into the reasons why a particular suggestion has attracted no response,
or even to commence an open battle with a lethargic minister or the
Cabinet as a whole. This, however, has little to do with the Ombudsman's own ideas. Political realities have kept most of them outside
the legislative arena. They have either been accepted as "noncontroversial" or have quietly gathered dust. The present Ombudsman,
a former secretary of the Constitutional Committee who remains in
contact with members of Parliament, may prove to be a more vigorous
and more adroit lobbyist than his predecessors.
X.

THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE OF THE WATCHMEN'S WORK

In law administration as in medicine an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure. When an official error occurs, it should of
course be corrected. If correction of one forestalls another, the value
of the correction is many times multiplied.
56 Examples: In 1961 the Chancellor wrote the Ministry of Justice that the use
of tape recorders to record courtroom proceedings created some dangers of diminishing
the completeness or accuracy of trial minutes. No affirmative suggestions were made
and no follow-up seems to have occurred. In 1962 the Ombudsman very mildly
suggested to the Ministry of Social Affairs that it might be a good idea, before
ordering a person to be confined in a closed workhouse because he had not supported
his family, to give him an opportunity to "say what he thinks about the proposed
order and to include a short remark about this in the minutes of the directorate."
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Both the Chancellor and the Ombudsman can claim significant
accomplishments as educators. For example, the Ombudsman advised
the Ministry of Justice concerning the rights of a specific complainant
who had been returned to prison because of misconduct while on
probation; apparently at his suggestion, this advice was then generalized
in the form of instructions circulated to all prison administrators.
Similarly, when the Chancellor has bluntly told a Minister that his
staff should note the result of a particular case handled by the Chancellor's office, the invariable consequence has been a ministerial communication for subordinate officials' future guidance. Ombudsman's
rulings that may have general significance are published in police magazines, one for higher ranking officers and one for the police force in
general, giving the rulings an impact far beyond the isolated cases
that occasioned complaints. In 1963 the Ombudsman concluded that
the Ministry of Finance had disregarded pertinent statutory directions
concerning collective bargaining with civil service organizations.
Mindful that bargaining sessions were about to commence in various
units of the Ministry of Social Affairs, he requested the head of that
ministry to issue a bulletin incorporating for his subordinates' information the Ombudsman's admonition to the Finance Minister. The
Minister's quick compliance with this suggestion warded off what
might have been a widening controversy.
Without minimizing the educational value of moves like these, one
must nevertheless note that the watchmen's work is usually more
redressive than instructive. Awareness of the Chancellor's and the
Ombudsman's actions is inadequately disseminated. Their judgments
are, more often than not, little known islets in the vast sea of public
administration.
Both officers view their annual reports to Parliament as their
chief channel of communication to officialdom and to the world at
large. Their expectation that these reports will be read and pondered
is not wholly mistaken. A random sampling of administrators in
different parts of Finland showed in 1964 that some do indeed say
they read the reports carefully-a child welfare officer here, a provincial prosecutor there, a rural district administrator somewhere else,
a judge of a provincial court in yet another place. But the readers
are more than offset by the nonreaders. A number of judges remarked
evasively that they "thumbed through the reports occasionally"; a
senior provincial administrator declared that "we get a couple of copies
each year, and of course anybody who wants to read them is welcome
to do so"; a major ministry believes that few of its officials in the field
lieceiye or read the reports, "though we do have several here in the
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ministry someplace and we probably have a copy in the library that
could be consulted if someone were individually interested." In short,
close study of the Ombudsman's and Chancellor's judgments has not
become a conventional part of official life, but is, rather, a matter of
individual initiative.
To some extent this reflects sheer unavailability of the documents
in question. Until recently the Ombudsman's annual report appeared
in an edition of only about seven hundred copies. In 1963, however,
2,047 copies were printed in Finnish and 725 in Swedish.
About
1,700 copies were sent to various public offices and institutions, the
remainder being sold to or otherwise distributed among libraries,
scholars, newspapers, and interested persons in Finland and abroad.
So restricted a circulation means that general awareness of the reports'
contents can be achieved only through supplemental publicity.5" Some
ministries, seemingly more alert than others to find interesting lessons
in the reports, occasionally issue bulletins and staff communications
that distill general directives from the Ombudsman's or the Chancellor's reactions to particular occurrences. Chiefly, however, the reports are received in silence.
The silence extends to the public press. Finnish newspapers pay
little attention to the general work of either the Ombudsman or the
Chancellor. Of course when major officials are enveloped by political
scandals, as in the rare instances when the watchmen have proceeded
against Cabinet ministers, newsmen's excitement becomes intense. A
few general problems-motion picture censorship and governmental
labor relations, for example---have been mentioned by the press. For
the rest, as a former Ombudsman remarked, "the day by day activities
pass unnoticed. They don't have enough sex and crime ingredients
to interest the papers."
The newspapers' inattention to the Chancellor and the Ombudsman handicaps the work of these officials. In other countries the
ombudsmen have been able to arouse a certain amount of journalistic
fervor about the importance of what they are doing. As a consequence,
their prosecutions, reprimands, and recommendations are widely reported in the daily press and thus come to the notice of many officials
57The Constitution of Finland provides in article 14 that "Finnish and Swedish
shall be the national languages of the Republic. The right of Finnish citizens to use
their mother tongue, whether Finnish or Swedish, before the courts and the administrative authorities, and to obtain from them documents in these languages, shall be
guaranteed by law. . . ." About 7.4% of the population of Finland according
to the 1960 census is Swedish speaking. Of the 189 professorships at the University
of Helsinki twenty-three are designated as "Swedish," and students may use their
mother tongue in work with all professors.
58Of course the determination of an individual matter is made known by letter
to the immediately affected official or organ long before the annual report appears.
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who would not receive or read an annual report. More than that,
the journalists' response to what the ombudsmen do creates, in turn,
a larger public response to their efforts.
The press appears not to be unfriendly to the Chancellor and the
Ombudsman, nor are they unfriendly to the press. They are simply
aloof. As shown in an earlier section of this discussion, newspaper
reports cause little stir in the watchmen's offices, nor do those offices
make much effort to arouse the newspapers' interest. Possibly the
fruits of their work would become more impressive if journalists could
be made aware of its significance and could be aided in following it
closely."
XI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Veli Merikoski, one of Finland's best known legal scholars, has
effectively discussed his country's mutually complementary efforts to
guarantee legality of administrative action and, simultaneously, to
nurture governmental effectiveness. "The provisions which ensure
that decisions shall be just," he has written, "cannot be made so
stringent that the decisions will be considerably delayed. This means
that the demand for guarantees of legality cannot be allowed, in administration, to push aside altogether the demand for prompt and
elastic action-that is to say, for efficiency. .

.

The trend towards

efficiency which is felt in administration makes it impossible to reach
perfection in the field of preventive guarantees of legality. Even if
such guarantees were to be made as strong as possible, the imperfections inherent in all human institutions would not allow a total
suppression of faulty decisions." "
Finland has highly developed its means of correcting those faulty
decisions that have not been totally suppressed. Few official determinations that affect private persons are unchallengeable. The Supreme Administrative Court has broad powers of review and its

members possess both the independence and the professional capability
to exercise those powers meaningfully. Moreover, the ordinary courts
of law have capacity to deal with administrative improprieties-not
only with the graver kinds that would be regarded as malfeasance in
any country, but also with lesser faults that would be regarded else59 In Sweden reporters regularly examine the in-flow of cases to the Ombudsman,
as well as his final determinations. See Gellhorn, supra note 3. The Finnish Official
Documents Act of 1951 broadened the opportunity to utilize materials in the Ombudsman's or Chancellor's possession. In a recent instance the Ombudsman has himself
protected and enforced the newspapers' right to know and to inform their readers;
he directed the Helsinki municipal government to reveal the names of applicants for
appointment to a staff vacancy.
60 Merikoski, Legality in Administrative Law: Some Trends in Evolution and

PracticalExperiences, 4 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 127, 128, 129 (1960).

1966]

FINLAND'S OFFICIAL WATCHMEN

where as noncriminal ineptitude or slothfulness."1 To assure that such
matters can be brought within judicial reach an unusual provision of
the Finnish Constitution authorizes private parties, quite independently
of the prosecutor's office, to commence a criminal action against a
public official.' Judges as well as other law administrators are personally liable to those injured by their mistakes, but the injured person
often has the option of suing the state, which is financially able to pay
whatever damages may be awarded and which must then reimburse
itself as best it can from the actual wrongdoer.'
With so many legal safeguards available today, the question
arises whether the Chancellor and the Ombudsman are still neededas undoubtedly they once were-to be the public's watchmen against
official mistakes. Nobody in Finland appears to have doubts on that
score. Public servants and private persons alike speak cordially about
their two official complaint bureaus. Their mere existence is generally
regarded as a valuable shield against oppression-in much the same way
as a nation's military force is usually thought to be a shield against
aggression.
"Little Man" and "Big Government" are among the most widely
accepted cliches of our times. Brawny allies like the Chancellor and
the Ombudsman may fortify Little Man's supposedly constant and
necessary efforts to avoid being crushed by Big Government. That
seems to be the conception now underlying these two offices.
A considerable discrepancy may be noted between conception and
reality. Neither the Ombudsman nor the Chancellor has sprung quickly
to the defense of basic rights in time of trouble since Finland achieved
independence. Both of them have become righteously wrathful about
a person's being fined a penny more than the permitted maximum, or
being detained in jail an extra day because the jailer has misread the
calendar. Nobody, however, recalls their taking an unpopular stand
in defense of larger civil liberties when these have been under heavy
pressure, as unfortunately they have been more than once.
0

1 See PEaA CoDE § 40.21, quoted p. 337 supra.
SFINiLAND CONST. art. 93 (2) ; see Merikoski, supra note 60, at 133.
63 This "protection' is not an unmixed blessing, according to some Finnish lawyers. Officials who fear the possibility of having to pay damages sometimes fail to
exercise their judgment vigorously, it is said; the public interest may suffer from
over caution as much as from over aggressiveness and often may suffer even more.
Furthermore, disbursing officials are said to be unduly rigid in passing on claims
against public funds; if a claimant is underpaid, he can sue to recover the full amount
of his claim, but if the claim has been honored and the auditor of accounts later
concludes that an overpayment has occurred, the disbursing official must reimburse
the public treasury. Lawyers think this leads disbursing officials, anxious to avoid
all risk of personal liability, to reject claims they really regard as probably valid,
with the result that litigation is often necessary to settle accounts that should have
been uncontested.
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Even in smaller issues with a civil liberties cast, the Ombudsman
shows no marked eagerness to range himself on the citizen's side. For
example, the Ombudsman's help was sought in 1964 by a conscript
whose superior officers had forbidden his publishing an article favoring
general nuclear disarmament and pacifism. On the basis of rather
vaguely identified "principles," the Ombudsman deemed this restriction
upon the citizen-soldier to be permissible. The Constitution says
that "Finnish citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the right
to print and publish .

.

.

without interference," " except that this

provision does not prevent "the establishment by law of restrictions
which are necessary . . . as far as persons on military service are

concerned." " No such restrictions had been established by statutory
law, if that is what the Constitution means "by law." Obviously an
inexpert foreigner cannot pretend to debate finer points of constitutional
law with a distinguished Finnish jurist. All that can be said here is
that the Ombudsman's analysis revealed no libertarian inclinations.
Another 1964 example may be of interest. A motion picture
importer complained that the Film Inspection Office-the film censorship board-had been biased and had disregarded laws applicable to its
work. After extensive correspondence the Ombudsman concluded
that the Office had indeed been prejudiced and, moreover, had entrusted
some of its censorial activities, quite improperly, to a clerk or bookkeeper. He then admonished the Office to behave itself better in the
future and also sent a copy of his decision to the Cabinet, to whom he
vaguely suggested the desirability of taking steps to guide the Office
and ensure the legality of its later proceedings. His reactions seem
mild when compared with his and the Chancellor's stern insistence upon
precision in other areas of general significance.
In 1962 a number of complainants reported that they had been
confined in a workhouse and had been forced to labor for their families'
support, without having been accorded an opportunity to be heard. The
records of the workhouse falsely showed, they asserted, that a hearing
had been held. Investigation proved their charges to be well founded;
the records were untrue. But the Ombudsman remarked, without any
great display of indignation, that the workhouse had no statutory
duty to give a hearing anyway, so its inaccuracy could be overlooked."
He did suggest, in restrained terms, that hearings might be desirable
64

FIMAND CoNsT. art. 10.
5 FINLAND CoNsT. art. 16.

06 This tolerance of inaccurate records may be contrasted with the prosecution
of City Judge Pursiainen in the preceding year. The minutes of a trial for violation
of liquor laws had been defectively compiled by Judge Pursiainen though apparently
without prejudice to the convicted defendant, who did not appeal. The judge was
convicted of imprudence in office and was reprimanded.
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in the future. Had the Ombudsman thought of himself as the citizen's
champion against naked governmental might, he would assuredly have
driven this point home with all the force he could command.
In the same year a resident of a rural community complained to
the Ombudsman that municipal officials had "warned" him that he
must improve his manners in dealings with his neighbors. The complainant, who apparently shared Mr. Justice Brandeis' feeling that "the
right to be let alone" is the right "most valued by civilized man," 7
argued to the Ombudsman that public officials had no competence to
intrude into his personal affairs. The Ombudsman, having inquired
into the matter, agreed that the local authorities had acted beyond the
limits of their power. But he dropped the issue there, without either a
stern admonition or an eloquent essay that might perhaps have reinforced the sorely beleaguered right of privacy.
None of this suggests that the Ombudsman is supernumerary or
that the Chancellor is unimportant. The Chancellor would be important if he never received or acted on an individual complaint; his service
as legal adviser to the Cabinet would alone justify his existence. With
little to distract him, the Ombudsman can concentrate on citizens' complaints and in doing so he doubtlessly performs a valuable social
function.
In the end, nonetheless, one comes away with the feeling that
in dealing with the problems of Little Man and Big Government, both
offices have lacked verve. Their potentialities have been only partly
realized. "Legality" has been given so technical a signification that
the public at large has no warm feeling for what they do. Technicality is not in itself to be derided. Formalities create normalities in
law administration. "The history of liberty," as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter well said, "has largely been the history of the observance
of procedural safeguards";e s and this is true even as to those safeguards that appear to the layman to be "mere technicalities." At some
point, however, formal correctness becomes formalism and technicality
becomes pettifoggery. That point seems very dose to being reached in
Finland today.
The public at large is unlikely to burst into cheers when the
Chancellor reports, for example, the recent prosecution and reprimanding of youthful Judge Edward Andersson. Andersson had penalized one Paavo Lehti for disregarding a summons to appear in the
court of Espoo. Unfortunately the summons was written on a printed
form that bore the address of the old courthouse from which
67 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
68 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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Andersson's court had recently moved. The location of the new courthouse had, however, been printed in the newspapers, it was posted on
the door of the abandoned courthouse, and it was not a closely guarded
secret in Espoo. Lehti had not explained his absence by saying that
he could not find the court to which he had been summoned. Yet
Andersson was prosecuted. When the court of appeal refused to
convict him, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which finally
agreed that the young judge had committed the crime of "imprudence"
when he had punished Lehti for ignoring the summons.
A succession of cases like that one might justify the thought that
Finland's watchmen were watching for the wrong things, or at any
rate were using too powerful magnifying glasses in their search for
flyspecks.
Major lapses from governmental rectitude are, fortunately, not
matters of constant occurrence in well ordered countries like Finland.
The Ombudsman and the Chancellor cannot be criticized, therefore,
for failing to achieve daily sensations by exposing arrogant administrators, bungling bureaucrats, grasping governors, and oppressive officials. If other countries were, however, to seek lessons in Finland's
experience, they might conclude that the citizenry's guardians need
bold initiative and keen awareness of the implications of individual
episodes even more than they need a passion for detail.

